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Direct connections between the war in Iraq and the realm of user experience are rare, so I was surprised when one popped up today in an article by the New York Times, titled 2 Car Bombings in Iraq Kill 25.

The article quotes an Iraqi, reacting to the destruction of a house containing a cache of munitions by American soldiers.  “The Americans are lying,” said Ali Jabbar, 28, one of several men digging through the rubble, where bicycle handlebars could be seen poking out. “If there were weapons there, they should have taken pictures to prove it.” But in a sign of the challenge Americans face here, Mr. Jabbar said that even if he saw such pictures, he would not be convinced that the destruction was justified. “The Americans can make it up with Photoshop,” he said.

It’s simultaneously terrible and fascinating that a tool I use regularly would appear in this sort of context. And yet it’s not unreasonable, given the ways that many futurists envision and describe warfare centered on information.

Here’s Alvin Toffler, from How will future wars be fought?

Above all, the full implications of what we termed Third Wave “knowledge warfare” have not yet been digested – even in the United States. The wars of the future will increasingly be prevented, won or lost based on information superiority and dominance. And that isn’t just a matter of taking out the other guy’s radar. It means waging the kind of full-scale cyber-war we described in War and Anti-War. Cyber-war involves everything from strategic deception and perception management down to tactical disruption of an adversary’s information systems. It also means understanding the role played by the global media in any conflict today. It means enhancing all your knowledge assets from intelligence, to research and development, training, and communication.

I first mentioned the ailing fortunes of the major U.S. auto makers as an example of the same pattern of decline common to old-style industrial organizations that’s starting in the enterprise software space. I chose American auto makers as an example of failing systemic health that offers insight because they are a visible cultural reference point, and not because I thought their demise was imminent.
But recent news from Ford and Daimler-Chrysler announcing dramatic job cuts and plant closures seems to point at exactly this in an eerie way. The article on Ford’s announcement even includes this quote from Gary N. Chaison, a professor of industrial relations at Clark University in Worcester, Mass, “This may not be the end, but it is certainly the beginning of the end of the automobile industry as we knew it”.
It seems the Iraq reconstruction effort is turning out to be another example of an enterprise infrastructure effort gone awry, in the real world. In the NY Times article Iraq Rebuilding Badly Hobbled, U.S. Report Finds James Glanz writes “…gross understaffing, a lack of technical expertise, bureaucratic infighting, secrecy and constantly increasing security costs” contributed to the ineffectiveness of the reconstruction effort.
That sounds like a classic enterprise software deployment to me
Glanz continues, “After years of shifting authority, agencies that have come into and out of existence and that experienced constant staff turnover, the rebuilding went through another permutation last month with almost no public notice.”
To close the circle and return to the realm of enterprise software, let’s compare the NY Times assessment of the reconstruction planning — “Mr. Bush said the early focus of the rebuilding program on huge public works projects – largely overseen by the office, the Project and Contracting Office – had been flawed.” — with James Roberts simple but very relevant question in Grand enterprise projects: why are we wasting our time?: “Instead of trying to eat the elephant whole, perhaps the better way is to take one bite at a time?”
Someone should have asked the same question in the early stages of planning the Iraq reconstruction effort, when the basic approach — bureaucratic, top-down, poorly structured — crystallized and was put into action.

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